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Atomic Veterans' Tort Claims: The Search for a
Tort Remedy Dead Ends With the
Veterans' Administration
From 1945 to 1963 the federal government detonated approximately 235 nuclear devices over southwestern United States and
the Pacific Ocean. The Department of Defense estimates that approximately 220,000 military personnel participated in those tests.
Many of those troops were exposed to low-level ionizing radiation.'
Additional troop exposure may have occurred in the occupation
forces of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan after the bombings in
2
1945. Collectively these groups are known as atomic veterans.
These atomic veterans have pursued various avenues in attempting
to recover for injuries caused by exposure to ionizing radiation.
Recently Congress enacted section 1631 of the Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy
Authorization Act of 19853 (Authorization Act) and the Veterans'
Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act 4
(Compensation Act). These acts have further restricted the avenues open to atomic veterans who seek tort remedies in court for
their injuries.
Part I of this note discusses veterans' attempts to recover in
tort against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act 5 (FTCA) and the difficulties they have encountered. Part II
covers veterans' attempts to recover from private defense contractors involved in the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons
and the impact of section 1631 of the Authorization Act. Part III
discusses available administrative remedies in light of the Compensation Act. Finally, Part IV concludes that Congress should ease
the requirements for granting atomic veterans' administrative
1 Ionizing radiation is the type of radiation emitted from nuclear explosions. It includes: X and gamma rays, alpha and beta particles, electrons, protons, neutrons, and cosmic radiation. J. COGGLE, BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATION (2d ed. 1983) (preface). For
an in-depth analysis describing the principles of radiation and nuclear physics involved in
this type of case, see Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (C.D. Utah 1984).
2 H. REP. No. 828, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984).
3 Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy
Authorization Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 1631, 98 Stat. 2492, 2646-47 (1984)
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2212 (Supp. 1985)).
4 Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No.
98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (to be codified at 38 U.S.C.) (see note accompanying 38

U.S.C.A. § 354 (Supp. 1985)).
5 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1982).
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claims to offset the barriers erected against atomic veterans tort
claims by statutes like the Authorization Act.
I.

Barriers to Atomic Veterans' Tort Claims
Against the Government

Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a claimant cannot
sue the federal government without the government's express consent. 6 Under the FTCA, however, the federal government has
waived its tort immunity, 7 subject to a number of express exceptions.8 The two exceptions which most critically affect claims by
atomic veterans are the discretionary function exception 9 and the
combatant activities exception.' 0
The discretionary function exception excludes any claim
"based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the government, whether or not the discretion involved is abused."'" The Supreme Court, in Dalehite v.
United States,' 2 applied the discretionary function exception, distinguishing planning activities from those which were merely opera6 W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 131 (5th ed.
1984).
7 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES § 52, at 2-6 to 2-9 (1985). Before the FTCA, the only method of obtaining redress for
governmental torts was an individual petition for relief. This process burdened both Congress and individual parties attempting to bring claims. By limiting sovereign immunity
statutorily, Congress sought to avoid the time consuming and often inequitable process of
reviewing private bills for relief. See also Note, Effect of the Feres Doctrine on Tort Actions
Against the United States by Family Members of Servicemen, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1242
(1982).
8 There are thirteen express exceptions to the government's waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982).
9 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
10 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1982). Two other code sections which also act as barriers to
atomic veterans' claims are 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982) (the foreign country exception) and
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982) (the punitive damages exception). The foreign country exception
bars any claim arising in a foreign country. This section especially inhibits those atomic
veterans claiming injuries related to the occupation of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. See, e.g.,
United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949); In re Consolidated U.S. Atmospheric Testing
Litig., 616 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Cal. 1985). The punitive damages exception states that the
federal government cannot be held liable for punitive damages under the FTCA. See, e.g.,
Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
11 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
12 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In Dalehite, persons injured in an explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer brought suit against the federal government for negligent production and
transportation of fertilizer. Production and distribution of fertilizer were carried out under
the direction of the government for shipment to areas occupied by the Allied forces following World War II. Plaintiffs attacked the cabinet level decision to initiate the fertilizer export program, the failure to experiment to determine the possibility of an explosion, the
drafting of the basic plan of manufacture, and the failure to police the loading and storage
of the fertilizer.
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tional.13 The Court found that a discretionary function included
more than the initiation of programs and activities; it also included
determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications, or schedules of options.1 4 The Court
found that "where there is room for a policy judgment and decision
there is discretion. It necessarily follows that the acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance
with official directions cannot be actionable."'- This broad definition of discretion operates to bar claimants' recovery when they
bring negligence suits against the government or government personnel for inadequate safety procedures in atomic testing.16
The second and more controversial barrier to veterans' suits
under the FTCA is the combatant activities exception. The
Supreme Court's expansive reading of this exception created the
Feres doctrine. 17 The combatant activities exception bars "[a]ny
13 Three lines of analysis have developed for deciding discretionary function questions.
First, and most common, is the planning-operational approach described in Dalehite. This
approach looks at what level of government the challenged conduct originated. Commentators have criticized the planning-operational distinction because "planning" and "operational" are not self-defining terms. Courts have not suggested guidelines that satisfactorily
distinguish between the two.
Second is the good samaritan test. Once the government exercises its discretion and
undertakes a non-mandatory activity inducing reliance, it has a duty to perform its good
samaritan task non-negligently. This test has also been criticized for failing to offer clear
standards for its application.
Third, and most favored by critics, is the quality of decision test. This test does not
draw illusory distinctions between levels of government activity, but rather requires a showing that the decisionmaker, acting within his authority, considered policy factors in reaching
a decision. See Comment, Scope of the Discretionary Function Under The Federal Tort Claims Act,
67 GEO. LJ. 879, 888-92 (1979). See also Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: The
DiscretionaryFunction Exception Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 161 (1976); Note, The Discretionary Function Exemption to The Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 ALB. L. REV. 721 (1978); Note, The
Nevada Proving Grounds: An Asylum For Sovereign Immunity?, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 627 (1981);
Comment, Government Liability ForNuclear Testing Under The Federal Tort Claims Act, 15 U.C.D.
L. REV. 1003 (1982); Comment, Federal Tort Claims: A Critiqueof the PlanningLevel-Operational
Level Test, 11 U.S.F.L. REV. 170 (1976).
14 346 U.S. at 35, 36.
15 Id. at 36.
16 See, e.g., In re Consolidated U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 616 F. Supp. 759 (N.D.
Cal. 1985). In this case, the court stated that:
The responsibility for carrying out the Safety Plan was assigned to the officials in
charge of the tests who had discretion to adopt and modify the Plan as necessary to
achieve the objectives of the test. A court would be ill-equipped to evaluate the
judgments concerning safety made by those officials based on the exigencies of the
moment. Any attempt to do so would, moreover, require a comprehensive reexamination of the conduct of the tests and the decisions made during their course
which would itself defeat the purpose of the exception.
Id. at 774.
17 The Feres doctrine relates to the series of cases stemming from Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), which have fleshed out the meaning of military injuries arising
"incident to service."
Courts and commentators have criticized the Feres doctrine since its inception in 1950.
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claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard during time of war." 18 The Court in
Feres v. United States 19 held that Congress did not intend to limit this
exception to combat and time of war. The Court stated that, under
this doctrine, the "Government is not liable under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of
or are in the course of activity incident to service." 20 Commentators have consistently attacked the Court's reading of the combatant activities exception as distorting the clear language of the
FTCA 2 1 and as inflicting undue hardship upon veterans. 22 The
Supreme Court, however, recently reaffirmed the Feres doctrine in
23
United States v. Schearer.
In Schearer, the Supreme Court focused upon four rationales
It is the only court-made exception to the FTCA. See, e.g., Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261,
264 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983). See notes 19-43 infra and accompanying text.
18 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1982).
19 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Feres was a consolidation of three cases. In Feres, the executrix
of a serviceman killed in a barracks fire while on active duty brought suit. The suit alleged
that the government negligently housed the serviceman in barracks which were known or
which should have been known to be unsafe because of a defective heating plant and for
failing to maintain an adequate watch. The latter two cases alleged negligent medical treatment. One plaintiff had abdominal surgery while in the army. Eight months later, after
plaintiff was discharged, a towel was removed from his stomach. In the other case, plaintiff
alleged that the death of a serviceman was due to negligent treatment by Army surgeons.
"The common fact of the three cases [was] that each claimant, while on active duty and not
on furlough, sustained injury due to the negligence of others in the armed forces." Id. at
138. The court barred all three claims. Id. at 146.
20 The Supreme Court has never considered the incident to service exception in a suit
arising out of the military's nuclear testing program. It has largely left the task of defining
"incident to service" claims to lower courts. See Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act-Atomic
Tests and The Feres Doctrine, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 433, 439 (1984).
The Court's decision in Feres, however, see note 19 supra, and its most recent endorsement of the doctrine in Schearer,see note 23 infra, demonstrate that the Court favors a broad
interpretation of injuries that are barred as occurring incident to service.
Commentators have suggested that courts should apply standards to the discretionary
function exception and abandon the Feres doctrine. See Note, From Feres to StenceL- Should
Military PersonnelHave Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 Mic. L. REV. 1099, 1102, 1126 (1979).
21 See, e.g., Note, The Nevada Proving Grounds: An Asylum For Sovereign Immunity?, 12 Sw.
U.L. REV. 627 (1981); Comment, supra note 20.
22 See Comment, supra note 20, at 440.
23 105 S. Ct. 3039 (1985). In Schearer, Private Schearer was kidnapped and killed by a
fellow serviceman while off duty and away from the base. Schearer's mother brought a
claim under the FTCA claiming that the Army's negligence caused the death of her son by
failing to control the other serviceman, to warn others that he was at large, and to remove
him from active military service. The court of appeals found that Feres did not bar the claim
because, "[g]enerally an off duty serviceman [who is] not engaged in military activity at the
time of injury, can recover under the FTCA .... ." Schearer v. United States, 723 F.2d
1102, 1106 (3d Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court reversed the decision, finding that the situs
of the murder was not nearly as important as whether the suit required a civilian court to
second guess military decisions and whether the suit might impair essential military discipline. The Court found that Schearer's claim struck at the heart of those concerns. 105 S.
Ct. at 3043.
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supportive of the Feres decision: (1) the need to maintain military
discipline; 24 (2) the uniquely federal relationship between service
members and the government; 25 (3) the existence of alternative
sources of compensation; 26 and (4) the anomalous results from allowing the government's duty to supervise servicemen to depend
upon state law. 27 The Schearer Court found the first two rationales
28
controlling:
[A]lthough the Court in Feres based its decisions on several
grounds, "in the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the
'peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,
the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and
the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Torts
Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent
acts committed in the course of military duty.' "29
While no longer controlling,30 the Court mentioned the third and
fourth rationales as factors which supported both its decision in
3l
Schearer and the overall Feres doctrine.
The Court, however, refused to create a uniform test to determine which cases Feres barred. "The Feres doctrine cannot be re24 The need to maintain military discipline first appeared in the Court's decision in
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954), and did not appear in the actual Feres decision. The Supreme Court in Schearer found the claims in Feres, Stencel, see note 33 infra, and
Schearer itself, "were the type of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness." 105
S. Ct. at 3044 (1985).
25 Id. at 3043. Under the FTCA, the United States is only liable under those circumstances in which a private citizen would be liable. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Because
private citizens do not maintain military units, the FTCA did not open the door to suits by
servicemen against their superior officers or the government. Feres, 340 U.S. at 142.
26 See Schearer, 105 S. Ct. at 3043, 3044 n.4.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 3043.
29 Id. (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963); United States v.
Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)).
30 105 S.Ct. at 3044 n.4.
31 Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982), "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" governs consequent liability under the FTCA. The Feres Court found it
irrational for a plan providing for those disabled in service to be dependent upon geographic considerations (noting divergency among state laws) over which servicemen have
no control (noting that civilians have freedom over their locations) and to laws which fluctuate in existence and value (noting the need for uniformity). Further, the Court was persuaded by the fact that most states had adopted workmen's compensation statutes which
provided the sole basis of liability in most employer-employee tort cases. Feres, 340 U.S. at
142, 143.
Subsequent Court decisions have weakened these rationales. See, e.g., United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). In Muniz the Court allowed two federal prisoners to sue under
the FTCA to recover damages from the government for personal injuries sustained during
confinement in federal prison. The prisoners' injuries allegedly resulted from the negligence of government employees. The Court allowed the suits despite the government's
control over prisoner location, and despite the divergent state laws which might have allowed for different recoveries. 374 U.S. at 161, 162.
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duced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be examined in
light of the statute as it has been construed in light of Feres and
32
subsequent cases."
One of the most important cases after Feres is Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States. 3 In Stencel, a National Guardsman injured by a malfunction in a cockpit ejection system sued both the
United States and the manufacturer in tort.34 The manufacturer
sought indemnity from the United States for any possible sums it
might be required to pay in tort damages.3 5 The Supreme Court,
affirming earlier dismissals by the district and circuit courts, held
that the Feres doctrine precluded third party indemnity suits for injury to military personnel. The Court reasoned that allowing the
suits would result in the second guessing of military decisions that
the Feres decision attempted to prevent. 3 6 Therefore, under Stencel,
veterans cannot successfully bypass Feres and recover from the government by suing private contractors in tort and then having the
government indemnify the contractors for damages awarded to
veterans.
The rationales given for Feres,3 7 and the subsequent application
of the doctrine in cases like Stencel, have created a broad definition
of what injuries are "incident to military service." 38 This broad definition has forced atomic veterans to try alternative theories of recovery.3 9 The theory of a post-discharge failure to warn has been
32 See 105 S. Ct. at 3043.
33 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
34 Id. at 667, 668.
35 Id. at 668.
36 Id. at 673, 674.
37 See notes 24-32 supra and accompanying text.
38 Many lower courts have taken a "but for" approach in determining which claims are
barred. The "but for" approach looks to whether the claim could have arisen had the plaintiff never been in the service. If the court determines that the injury would not have occurred "but for" the plaintiffs enlistment in the armed services, then itis barred as incident
to service under Feres.
Commentators have long criticized this type of analysis as mechanical jurisprudence,
and have instead favored an analysis which bars claims as incident to service only if they
address the policy concerns of Feres. The Court's decision in Schearer supports this latter
form of analysis. See 105 S.Ct. at 3043. See also Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline,and the
Weapons of War, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 353 (1985); Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine and a
Better Definition of Incident to Service, 56 ST. JOHNs L. REv. 485 (1982); Comment, The Feres
Doctrine: Has it Created Remediless Wrongs For Relatives of Servicemen?, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 929,
953 (1983).
39 A complete analysis of all the attempts by veterans to circumvent the Feres doctrine is
beyond the scope of this note. Several categories of claims exist: intentional tort claims,
suits brought against individual military personnel or civilian employees, constitutional tort
claims, claims by servicemen's wives and children, and finally, claims of separate post-discharge torts of failure to warn. See generally Note, Denial of Atomic Veterans' Tort Claims: The
EnduringFallout From Feres v. United States, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 259 (1983).
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the most successful of these other approaches. 40 Under this doctrine, the serviceman must prove a separate act of negligence
occurring after discharge which aggravated a preexisting injury. 41
A majority of jurisdictions considering the issue, however, have
found that failure to warn of the dangers of being exposed to ionizing radiation is not a separate tort. Rather, it is a continuing tort
having its origin during active military service. 42 Therefore, Feres
generally prevents these suits. 43 Unable to recover from the gov-

ernment in tort in the great majority of cases, atomic veterans' have
turned to the contractors involved in the weapons development and
testing program for recovery.
II.
A.

Private Defense Contractors
The Government ContractorDefense

Unable to recover from the government in tort, atomic veterans sought compensation directly from private contractors involved
in the weapons development and testing program. 44 Stencel bars
tort indemnification of contractors by the government for injuries
40 The post-discharge failure to warn theory is an attempt to bypass the Feres bar for
injuries occurring incident to service. Currently there are three views concerning postdischarge torts: (1) recovery should be allowed only if the original tort is intentional; (2)
recovery should be allowed only if the government learned of the harm to the serviceman
after his discharge; and (3) the post-discharge tort is merely a continuation of an incident to
service tort. See Comment, Heilman v. United States, 24 Du. L. REV. 309, 325 (1985).
Under the post-discharge theory, veterans do not attempt to recover for their original
injury, rather they attempt to recover for the negligent aggravation of those injuries caused
by subsequent failure by the government to warn of the long term health consequences.
The success of this theory, though limited, is greater than other methods attempted by
veterans. Most courts, however, have not recognized the failure to warn as an independent
tort. Most see the injury as a continuous tort, having its origin incident to military service
and therefore barred by Feres. See Comment, Validity of the Failureto Warn in the Context of the
Feres Doctrine: Heilman v. United States, 58 TEMP. L. Q. 221 (1985). See also Note, Postdischarge Failureto Warn: Judicial Response to Veterans Attempts to Circumvent the Feres Doctrine, 30
VIL. L. REv. 263 (1985).

41 See note 40 supra.
42 See note 40 supra.
43 For applications of the differing views on post-discharge torts, see, e.g., Laswell v.
Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 267 (8th Cir. 1982) (treating the claim as a continuous tort); Broudy
v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 125 (9th Cir. 1981) (requiring knowledge on the government's part to be obtained after discharge); Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.
Ohio 1980) (requiring an intentional tort). See also Comment, Heilman v. United States, 24
Du. L. REv. 309 (1985).
Courts have attacked the post discharge tort as little more than artful pleading. See,
e.g., Kelly v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356, 361 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (dismissing an atomic
veteran's claim finding the pre- and post-discharge distinction artificial). See also Note, supra
note 40.
44 It is virtually impossible to predict whether a veteran may pursue a failure to warn
claim against the United States or must seek his remedy from the contractor. Miller, Liability and Relief of Government Contractorsfor Injuries to Service Members, 104 MIL. L. REv. 1, 12
(1984).
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to veterans. 4 5 By contract, however, the government reimburses
atomic weapons contractors for any liability arising out of their
assistance in the weapons program, including the costs of litigation.4 6 Through this mechanism of suing only the contractor, combined with the government's subsequent contractualreimbursement
of the contractor, atomic veterans sought to recover for their injuries. Because of the government's degree of control over the entire
nuclear weapons testing program, 47 however, such claims are rarely
48

successful.

Many suits by military personnel in both nuclear and non-nuclear contexts are dismissed upon the government contractor defense. 49 This defense is essentially an admission by state and
federal courts that manufacturers lack the requisite control over
specifications in weapons systems and that the federal government
is the proper defendant to sue. 50 This doctrine, however, developed on an ad hoc basis, is highly dependent on state tort law. 5 ' In
Feres, the Supreme Court stated that it was unfair to subject the military to fifty different jurisdictions. 5 2 Arguably, it is even more unfair to subject defense contractors, who lack control over the
specifications and testing of atomic weapons, to the laws of fifty
45

Stencel, 431 U.S. at 674.

46 S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 375, 376 (1984).
47 Only the government sets policy, makes decisions, and controls the activities and
circumstances regarding atomic weapons testing. See S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
375 (1984).
48 The Supreme Court recognized a type of vicarious sovereign immunity for contractors in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940). In Yearsly, an Army Corps of
Engineers contractor diverted the course of a river causing erosion to plaintiff's land. The
Court found that the liability of the contractor depended on whether the diversion of the
river was outside the scope of the contractor's authority. Id. at 21.
49 "[T]he government contractor defense derives from the doctrine of federal immunity established by Feres and Stencel." In re Air Crash Disaster at Manheim Germany, 769
F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 851 (1986).
50 The defense is based on the premise that a contractor who complies with required
specifications provided by the government ought to be insulated from liability for any harm
resulting from those specifications. Miller, supra note 44, at 57.
The Ninth Circuit developed a checklist for applying the government contractor defense. First, a contractor must demonstrate that the government is immune from liability
under the Feres-Stencel doctrine. Second, the contractor must prove that the government
established reasonably precise specifications for the allegedly defective equipment. Third,
the contractor must show that the equipment conformed to those specifications. Fourth,
the contractor must show that it warned the government about errors or dangers involved
in the use of the equipment that were known to contractors but unknown to the government. See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1043 (1984).
51 Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 568 (5th Cir. 1985). In suits by members of the
armed services for defects in designs supplied by the government, federal common law provides a basis for the application of the government contractor defense. But a "clear majority of courts that have considered the availability of the government contractor defense
under applicable state law have decided to adopt the defense." Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
52 Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-43. See also note 31 supra.
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jurisdictions than it is to subject the military, which had such con53
trol, to those laws.

Six additional policy considerations support the government
contractor defense. First, holding the government contractor liable, without regard to the government's activity in fixing the product's design or specifications, undercuts the Feres-Stencel doctrine by
allowing suppliers to pass the costs of accidents on to the United
States, despite the government's tort immunity. 54 Second, a member of the armed services would be allowed to question military decisions and obtain relief for the actions of military officials,
regardless of whether the litigation for defective design named the
government or the military contractor.5 5 Third, civilian courts
would be compelled to second-guess professional military judgment concerning the conduct of the armed services. 56 Fourth, military contractors often lack power to negotiate alterations in product
design specifications. Military efforts to push technology to the
limit requires that specifications be complied with, even if doing so
means taking risks beyond those ordinarily acceptable for consumer goods. 57 Fifth, the availability of the government contractor
defense is conditioned on military contractors informing the government of all known risks.5 8 Because the government contractor
has already fully disclosed all known risks to the government, the
government should bear responsibility and not the contractor. 59
Sixth, fairness dictates that the contractor should not be ultimately
held liable for a dangerous design when the responsibility properly
53 See note 31 supra.
54 Courts have stated that without the government contractor defense, contract prices
would increase and render governmental immunity meaningless by circumventing the Feres
doctrine. Additionally, courts are concerned that costs to the government will increase because of increased cost or unavailability of liability insurance for the contractor. See, e.g., In
re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), reh'g denied in
part,534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). But see Miller, supra note 44, at 51 ("attempting to
obtain sovereign immunity for a contractor on the basis that the government would lose its
immunity because of the common law of contractual indemnification appears to be a false
argument"); Comment, Schoenborn v. Boeing Co.: The Government ContractorDefense Becomes
a "Windfall"for Military Contractors, 40 U. MiAMi L. REV. 287, 295-97 (1985) (arguing that
the concerns expressed above ignore other liability costs and that there has been no showing of increased costs to the government following the Stencel decision).
55 "[A] trial between a serviceman and a military contractor in which government specifications are at issue would inevitably implicate the same concerns that underlie the
Supreme Court's Feres and Stencel decisions." Bynum, 770 F.2d at 565.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 566.
58 Id. The burden of proof is on the government contractor to establish that the government's knowledge was equal to or greater than theirs. Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol Div.
of Boeing Co., 553 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
59 770 F.2d at 566. This defense provides contractors an incentive to work closely with
military authorities in the development and testing of equipment.
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lies with the government. 60
B. The Department of Energy National Security and Military
Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1985

Congress passed section 1631 of the Department of Energy
National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act 61 for three reasons. First, Congress wanted to mini-

mize the uncertainty faced by nuclear weapons contractors with
regard to liability for servicemen's exposure to low-level radiation. 62 Second, Congress recognized the government's own fiscal
responsibility to defend and contractually indemnify contractors in
such suits. 6 3 Finally, Congress wanted to further the policy consid-

erations underlying the government contractor defense. 64
Section 1631 removes atomic veterans' state tort claims against
the contractors to federal court and requires them to overcome the
nearly insurmountable barrier of the FTCA. 65 Essentially, section
1631 is a federal codification of the government contractor defense
for those contractors involved in the atomic weapons testing program. Section 1631, like the government contractor defense, recognizes the unique relationship between the government and
atomic weapons contractors 66 and the control exercised by the gov-

60 Id.
61 Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy
Authorization Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 1631, 98 Stat. 2492, 2646-47 (1984)
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2212 (Supp. 1985)).
62 The purpose of the Authorization Act is to:
clarify the status of certain contractors that operate or operated Governmentowned facilities relating to atomic energy national defense activities and are in
litigation arising from those activities. . . . [L]iterally thousands of plaintiffs have
filed suit against the operators of the government laboratories that have participated in the government's nuclear weapons tests. . . . Plaintiffs are seeking tens
of billions of dollars in damages. Because the contractors are fully indemnified by
the government under the terms of their contracts, the taxpayer will ultimately
bear this burden.
S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 374, 376 (1984).
63 Id. at 376.
64 See notes 44-60 supra and accompanying text.
65 Representative Barney Frank of Mass. described the operation of the Authorization
Act as follows: "[T]he government can walk in and say, 'Time out, new defendant; we're
now the defendant. Those people are not the defendant, and there is something called the
Feres doctrine and you're out of court.' " Litigation Relating To Atomic Testing: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on theJudiciaty,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Atomic TestingHearings]. See also notes 643 supra and accompanying text.
66 S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 376 (1984); see notes 53-57supra and accompanying text. See also Atomic Testing Hearings,supra note 65, at 20, 23, 31 (testimony of Bernard
W. Vance, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department ofJustice)
(stating that the proposed Act would not legitimize the government contractor defense,
would not include other types of contractors, but would avail the exemptions and exclu-
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ernment over weapons testing. 67 Furthermore, section 1631 recognizes the uncertainty created by differing state laws, 68 the
unfairness of leaving the contractor solely accountable to the public, 6 9 and the government's ultimate responsibility to pay for dam70
ages despite the Feres bar to veterans' tort claims.
Unlike the government contractor defense, however, section
1631 does not require that the contractor demonstrate full disclosure to the government to obtain the Act's protection. 7' The Authorization Act apparently assumes full disclosure by the
contractor. Without requiring contractors to demonstrate full disclosure, courts will undoubtedly dismiss more atomic veterans'
cases at an earlier level of trial-if not on a motion for a judgment
72
on the pleadings.
Section 1631 provides that an action against the United States
shall be the exclusive remedy for injuries "due to exposure to radiation based on acts or omissions by a contractor in carrying out an
atomic weapons testing program under a contract with the United
sions available to the United States under the FTCA and Feres to atomic weapons
contractors).
67 See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the United States is not liable and
cannot be sued for the acts of independent contractors providing goods and services to the United States. The contractors operating nuclear testing facilities for
the Department of Energy or its predecessor agencies, or those participating in the
atomic weapons testing program, however, are unique. They are not typical
of contract suppliers of commercially provided goods or services. Only the government sets the policy, makes the decisions, and controls the activities and circumstances regarding atomic weapons research, development, and testing.
Consequently, these contractors were utilized by the United States as instruments
of national policy to assist in this entirely governmental task.
Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy AuthorizationAct
of 1985: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Procurement.and Military Nuclear Systems of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984) (letter to the Speaker of the House
by Theodore Garrish, General Counsel for the Department of Energy).
68 See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
69 See note 60 supra and accompanying text. See also note 72 infra. Congress was concerned that negative perception of the contractors' role in the weapons program could
jeopardize some contractors continued participation. See generally S. REP. No. 500, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Atomic Testing Hearings,supra note 65, at 43-47, 52.
70 See notes 54 and 62 supra.
Without consolidation of these many cases under the leadership of the Department ofJustice, with the United States as a co-defendant, a variety ofjudgments
are possible based on the provisions of a different state law [sic] ....
[Tihe government's interest should receive the best uniform defense available. In addition,
the committee does not believe that any contractor should be used as an instrumentality of the government and then be abandoned when inundated by a flood of
litigation arising from that same government activity.
S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1984).
71 See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
72 While not mandating dismissal, § 1631's removal of the state tort claim to federal
court under the FTCA will cause courts to dismiss cases against government contractors
more quickly. See notes 73-80 infra and accompanying text.
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States." 73 The Act requires litigants to maintain any action against
these contractors solely against the United States pursuant to the
FTCA. 74 The Act applies to alleged acts or omissions of contrac75
tors "without regard to when the act or omission occurred."
Also, the contractor's employees are treated as employees of the
federal government. 7 6 Therefore, even the employees have access
to the discretionary function defense.
Section 1631 operates in the following manner: When a litigant files a civil action against an atomic weapons contractor for
personal injury, loss of property, or death due to exposure to radiation from United States atomic weapons testing programs, the contractor must promptly deliver all process served upon him to the
Attorney General of the United States. 7 7 Upon certification by the
Attorney General, the state court suit against the contractor is removed to federal district court, without bond, at any time before
trial. 78 The United States replaces the contractor as the defendant
and the proceedings are deemed a tort action against the United
States under the FTCA. 79 For the purposes of removal, certification by the Attorney General under this subsection establishes con80
tractor status conclusively.
Because of the harsh limitations on veterans recovering under
the FTCA, 8 1 the constitutionality of section 1631 has been ques82
tioned. In In re Consolidated U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litigation (Atmospheric Testing), a federal district court found that national defense
concerns provided Congress with a rational basis to pass the Au73 42 U.S.C.A. § 2212(a), (b) (Supp. 1985).
74 Id. § 2212(a)(2).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. § 2212(b).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See notes 6-43 supra and accompanying text.
82 616 F. Supp. 759 (D.C. Cal. 1985). The First Circuit recently upheld the Act's constitutionality, affirming the district court's decision in Hammond v. E G & G Co., No. 842432 (MA), slip op. (D. Mass. 1985). In Hammond, the district court applied the Authorization Act to a former civilian employee of the Department of Defense, substituted the government as defendant in place of the weapons testing contractor, and dismissed the case for
plaintiff's failure to file a claim under the FTCA.
The First Circuit affirmed the decision, rejecting the plaintiff's claims that the Act constituted an uncompensated taking of property, an "unexpected" law without procedural
due process, a violation of equal protection, a denial of the seventh amendment right to a
jury trial, was beyond Congress' power under the tenth amendment, constituted a violation
of the general constitutional right of access to the courts, and violated the Article I prohibitions against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing contracts. Hammond
v. United States, 786 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1986).
The question of the Act's constitutionality is also pending in district court in Nevada.
See Prescott v. United States, No. 80-142 (RDF) (D. Nev. filed May 14, 1980).
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thorization Act.8 3 The court also held the application of the Authorization Act to pending actions constitutional. The court stated
that such application did not violate procedural due process,8 4 operate as a taking of property without just compensation, 5 violate
the separation of powers,8 6 nor deprive atomic veterans of their
7
seventh amendment right to a jury trial.
On appeal, the constitutionality of the Act would likely be upheld for several reasons. First, courts give Congress great deference in the area of national defense.88 Second, Congress has
demonstrated its preference for handling veterans' claims administratively rather than under the FTCA.89 Third, the nature of the
relationship between servicemen and the government is unique. 90
Fourth, all of the policy considerations addressed by the government contractor defense continue to apply. 91 The contractors did
not order the tests, did not set the times or the places for the tests,
nor direct military or government personnel to participate in
83 616 F. Supp. at 768.
84 Id. at 768, 769. The court cited several previous cases where Congress had abrogated pending claims to support its decision that the Act did not violate procedural due
process: United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370 (1907) (Claims for refund on import duties of sugar which had been collected without the requisite congressional authority
were abrogated by a congressional grant retroactively authorizing their collection. Even if
the right to recover the payments was a vested right, the right would be subject to congressional power to legislate in the area.); de Rodulfa v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240 (D.C.
Cir.) (The district court set aside a Veterans' Administration order and awarded attorneys'
fees to plaintiffs. Congress then amended the governing statute to preclude judicial review
of Veterans' Administration orders. The court of appeals upheld the retroactive application
of the amendment, interpreting it as Congress' preexisting intent to preclude judicial review of all benefits decisions of the Veterans' Administration), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949
(1972).
85 616 F. Supp. at 770. The court found no taking of property withoutjust compensation under the fifth amendment.
Unlike contract claims, the tort claims asserted here lack "investment backed expectations." Not only are they contingent in nature, but they also arise in a field in
which the law remains to be developed. The governmental action, moreover, does
not abrogate the claims but subjects them to the tort claims procedure which the
plaintiffs could reasonably expect might be applied.
Id. (citations omitted).
86 Id. at 770-71. The court found no violation of Article III separation of powers in
attempting to alter the rule of decision in'a pending case in favor of the government. This
decision, based upon finding the Authorization Act does not withdraw jurisdiction from the
federal courts, does not deprive a party of the benefit of ajudgment, and does not mandate
the outcome of particular cases. It substitutes remedies but leaves the application of the
rules of law, including any defenses, for judicial determination.
87 Id. at 768 n.6. The plaintiffs argued that the Act deprived them of their right to a
jury trial. The court held that the retroactive application of preclusive defenses was not
barred by the Constitution.
88 See notes 1-60 supra and accompanying text.
89 See notes 61-80 supra and accompanying text.
90

See note 25 supra.

91 See notes 44-60 supra and accompanying text.
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them. 92 Each nuclear test since 1946 has been made under the statutory direction of Congress, approved before the fact by the Presi93
dent, and directly supervised by government officials.
Section 1631 provides certainty for atomic weapons contractors. Under the language of the statute it seems clear that with the
entire range of FTCA defenses available to contractors, courts will
dismiss most atomic veterans' claims before a trial on the merits is
held. While the Authorization Act provides the consistency that
was lacking under the government contractor defense, this consistency does not necessarily mean an equitable result for atomic
veterans.
III.

The Administrative Recovery Scheme For Atomic Veterans

In light of all the barriers to recovery for tort claims, the only
remaining remedy available for most veterans is an administrative
claim through the Veterans' Administration. Commentators have
criticized the handling of radiation exposure cases by the Veterans'
Administration. 9 4 The Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure
Compensation Standards Act 95 (Compensation Act), however, does
provide some improvement. Prior to this Act, an atomic veteran
had to overcome serious administrative hurdles. He was required
to prove his presence at the atomic test site, 9 6 the extent of his exposure to radiation, 9 7 and the causation of his injury through that
98
radiation exposure.
These requirements were difficult for the veterans to satisfy.
Many veterans found proving presence at a test site difficult, if not
impossible, because the records of persons taking part in such tests
were destroyed by a fire in 1973. 9 9 Veterans also had difficulty
92 See S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 376 (1984).
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline and the Weapons of War, 29 ST. Louis
U.LJ. 383, 394 (1985); Comment, An Interpretationof the Feres DoctrineAfter West v. United
States and In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 70 IowA L. REv. 737, 749-50
(1985).
95 Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No.
98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (to be codified at 38 U.S.C.) (see note accompanying 38
U.S.C.A. § 354 (Supp. 1985)).
96 Review of FederalStudies on Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation Exposure and Implementation of Public Law 97-72: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm.
on eterans'Affairs of the House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1983) (testimony
of John Smitherman of the National Association of Atomic Veterans) [hereinafter cited as
Radiation Exposure Hearings].
97 Id.
98 Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No.
98-542, §§ 2, 3, 98 Stat. 2725, 2725-27 (1984).
99 In 1973, a fire destroyed 17 million service records. Approximately 80% of the
records were from the period during which the Nevada tests took place. See I Effect of Radiation on Human Health-Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health
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proving exposure levels. The "film badges,"' 0 0 originally issued to
some members of the Armed Forces in connection with the atmospheric nuclear testing program, 01 provided an incomplete measure
of radiation exposure because they were not capable of recording
inhaled, ingested, or neutron doses10 2 of radiation. 0 3 The readings of these badges were further distorted because many badges
were shielded during the detonation and were worn only for limited
periods during and after each detonation. 0 4 Moreover, most test
participants were never issued "film badges."' 105 Finally, veterans
found the burden of proving that radiation caused their injuries
impossible to overcome unless they suffered from an extremely limited number of rare ailments associated almost exclusively with radiation exposure. 0 6 As a result of these factors, less than two
percent of 7 veterans' exposure-related claims received com0
pensation.'
Congress apparently recognized that its disposition of cases
under the Feres doctrine and the newly enacted section 1631 of the
Authorization Act depended on the existence of an administrative
scheme for its justification. 08 If the government was going to handle military claims for radiation exposure injuries in an administrative workmen's compensation context, it had to provide a realistic
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
1099-1100 (1978). See also Note, The Cancer Spreads: Atomic Veterans Powerless in the Aftermath
of Feres v. United States, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 391 (1984).
100 The film badges measured radiation exposure and were a primary source of dose
information.
101 Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No.
98-542, §§ 2(8), 2(9), 98 Stat. 2725, 2726 (1984).
102 A neutron dose is a type of radiation emitted near nuclear explosions incapable of
being measured by film badges. See Veterans' Exposure to Ionizing Radiation as a Result of Detonation of Nuclear Devices: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 101 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Veterans' Exposure Hearings].
103 Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No.
98-542, §§ 2(8), 2(9), 98 Stat. 2725, 2726 (1984).
104 Id. § 2(9).
105 Id. §§ 2(8), 2(9).
106 "[IThe U.S. government has spent close to $2 billion for research of the health effects of exposure to low-level ionizing radiation. At least 80,000 scientific papers on the
subject have been written worldwide. While much has been learned about the carcinogenic
effects of high doses of radiation exposure, scientists are still uncertain how low-level ionizing radiation exposure causes cancer, and how to predict the effects of exposure to low
doses of ionizing radiation." H. REP. No. 828, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984).
Centers For Disease Control studies found a statistically significant portion of atomic
veterans suffering from leukemia and polycythemia vera (a bone marrow disease) compared
to the rest of the population. The study, however, did not find evidence of increased frequency of cancer or death from cancer for atomic veterans. H. REP. No. 592, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7-9 (1984).
107 Radiation Exposure Hearings,supra note 96, at 35 (testimony of Max R. Woodall, Director of Compensation and Pension Services of the Veterans' Administration). See also 130
CONG. REC. S6144, S6417 (daily ed. May 22, 1984).
108 Atomic Testing Hearings,supra note 65, at 27.
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prospect of obtaining compensation. The Compensation Act attempts to facilitate atomic veterans' administrative claims by easing
their burden of proof as to presence and dosage levels at the test
site. 10 9 The Act also attempts to ease atomic veterans' burden of
proving causation by requiring further study of the health effects of
low-level radiation exposure. 110
Under the Compensation Act, atomic veterans are not required
to produce evidence substantiating their exposure, if the information in the veteran's service records and other records of the Department of Defense do not conflict with the claim that the veteran
was present at the test site when the claimed exposure occurred. 1 ,
This allows a presumption of presence at the exposure site for
those veterans whose records were destroyed.! 1 2 The Act, in addition, officially recognizes the unreliability of the film badge readings, 1 3 mandates review of devices and techniques which may be
useful in determining previous radiation exposure, 1 14 and requires
the establishment of minimum standards for preparing dose estimates."15 Finally, the Act creates an independent board of medical
experts to study the more than 800,000 medical reports which describe the effects of low-level radiation. 1 16 This board makes its
recommendations to the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs," 17 who
evaluates the board's findings" 18 and prescribes regulations to establish guidelines, standards, and criteria for resolving atomic veterans' claims.' 19
Although the Compensation Act reforms appear extensive,
they are inadequate to enable most veterans to overcome their burden of demonstrating causation.' 20 Experts disagree about the
health effects of ionizing radiation exposure, 12 1 and the problem is
further complicated by the multiple dosage variables involved in
109 Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No.
98-542, §§ 2, 5, 98 Stat. 2725, 2725-26, 2727-29 (1984).
110 Id.§§ 6, 7.
111 Id. § 5(b)(3)(B).
112 See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
113 Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No.
98-542, § 2(8), 2(9), 98 Stat. 2725, 2726 (1984).

114 Id. § 7(a)(2)(a).
115
116
117
118

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 7.
§ 6.
§ 6(d)(3).
§ 5(b)(1)(A), (1)(B).

119 Id. § 5(a).
120 See generally Examining How Liability Should Be Assessed ForDamages Caused By Low-Level
Radiation Effects Which Appear As Cancer Years After Exposure: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-192 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Radiation Damage Hearings].
121 Veterans' Exposure Hearings,supra note 102, at 16-100, 293-302, 371-81.
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each test. 122 Some experts doubt whether the actual health effects
on individuals in these cases will ever be known, 2 3 or that if a correlation between exposure and disease is found, it will not be during the atomic veterans' lifetimes.' 24 The Compensation Act
requires a showing of "sound medical and scientific evidence."' 12-5
In evaluating scientific studies, the Administrator must take
into account whether the results are "statistically significant, are ca126
pable of replication, and [are able to] withstand peer review"'
before the Administrator can accept the disease's connection with
service exposure.' 27 These requirements are simply too difficult to
be of much assistance to atomic veterans given the current state of
scientific disagreement over radiation's effects on health. The
Compensation Act, like previous attempts to increase the availability of administrative remedies, 28 will likely have little impact. In
fact, the Compensation Act may be harmful to atomic veterans by
giving the false appearance of increasing the chances of recovery
without eliminating the real barrier: causation.
An earlier proposed version of the Compensation Act 129 created a temporary presumption of causation 30 in favor of atomic
veterans where evidence indicated a possible connection between
122 See generally Radiation Damage Hearings,supra note 120, at 61-192.
123 It is presently impossible to determine the cause of cancer, even when people have
received a moderate to large amount of radiation. The numbers of specific cancers can be
statistically estimated, but we cannot predict which individuals will develop cancer, and if
the cancer develops, we cannot state with certainty whether it was caused by radiation. Id.
at 70. Experts cannot even agree upon the usefulness of statistical models because of the
large number of assumptions required before any calculation of cancer incidence can begin.
Id. at 152-211.
124 Id. at 187-90.
125 Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No.
98-542, §§ 3, 5(b)(2)(A)(i), 98 Stat. 2725, 2727-29 (1984).
126 Id. § 5(b)(l)(A).
127 Id. § 5(a).
128 Veterans' Health Care, Training and Small Business Loan Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-72, § 102, 95 Stat. 1047, 1048 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 601 (1982)) (authorized priority
medical care at Veterans' Administration facilities for any disability of an atomic veteran
who may have been exposed to radiation unless the disability is found to have a cause other
than exposure); Veterans Health Care Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-160, § 601, 97
Stat. 993, 1006-08 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 219 (1982)) (the conduct of epidemiological
studies); Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 7, 96 Stat. 2059, 2060 (1983) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 214 (1982)) (the development of radioepidemiological tables setting forth the
probabilities of causation between various cancers and exposure to radiation).
129 See H. REP. No. 592, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1984).
130 Congress intended this earlier version of the Compensation Act to provide atomic
veterans with certain benefits, "notwithstanding that there is insufficient medical evidence
to conclude that such diseases are service connected." Id. This early version also required
that the disease manifest itself within 20 years. Id. The Compensation Act as adopted
leaves this latency period up to the Administrator's determination. Veterans' Dioxin and
Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, § 5(b)(3)(A), 98
Stat. 2725, 2729 (1984).
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in-service exposure and later disease manifestation.131 This presumption in favor of atomic veterans, while scientific investigation
continued, better carried out the government's stated policy of
resolving doubts in favor of veterans than the version of the Compensation Act which Congress ultimately adopted.1 32 This earlier
version of the Compensation Act would have, if adopted, given
atomic veterans a reasonable prospect of compensation during
1 33
their lifetimes.
IV. Conclusion
In light of the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of Feres in Schearer
and the passage of both the Authorization Act and the Compensation Act, the federal government is sending a clear signal that it
prefers to handle atomic veterans cases administratively. Veterans
who wish to pursue tort claims will continue to face a difficult battle. The Authorization Act partially cleared the muddied waters of
atomic veterans' tort claims by barring most veterans' suits against
atomic weapons contractors.
Unfortunately, the Compensation Act fails to create a corresponding increase in the availability of administrative remedies by
131 This earlier version of the Compensation Act would have established the causation
presumption in favor of veterans with leukemia, polycythemia vera, and carcinoma of the
thyroid. H. REP. No. 592, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 14 (1984). The additional cost of this
presumption was expected to be minimal. Id. at 14, 15. The Compensation Act as adopted
lists the above categories as having some evidence of causation through radiation exposure,
but also lists malignancies of the lung, bone, liver, skin, and female breast as suspect. Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542,
§ 2(5), 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) . These additional categories, without the 20-year manifestation requirement found in the earlier proposal, would undoubtedly increase the cost of
granting a statutory presumption of causation. But the increased cost would be partially
offset by earlier dismissals of claims against atomic weapons contractors under the Authorization Act. See notes 61-93 supra and accompanying text. Concerns that atomic veterans
would be treated differently than veterans exposed to agent orange are counteracted by the
fact that atomic veterans have been singled out as a distinct group under the Authorization
Act. See notes 61-93 supra and accompanying text.
132 Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No.
98-542, § 2(13), 98 Stat. 2725, 2726 (1984).
133 Other barriers exist to veterans' compensation by either tort claims or administrative
hearings: 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1982) requires as a prerequisite to suing the United States
that the plaintiff first present the claim to the appropriate federal agency. The agency must
deny the claim or six months must lapse before suit may be brought on the claim. See, e.g.,
Shipek v. United States, 752 F.2d 1352, 1353 (9th Cir. 1985). 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982)
provides that federal courts cannot review benefit decisions of the Veterans' Administration
except on constitutional grounds. 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c) (1982) imposes a flat ten dollar fee
limit on all work performed by an attorney in representing a veteran pursuing a serviceconnected death or disability claim; the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality in Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985). 38 U.S.C.
§ 3405 (1982) provides harsh penalties for violations of the previous code section. Congress is investigating modifications of these restrictions on veterans' compensation. See generally S. REP. No. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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not fully addressing the problem of causation. Establishing a presumption that atomic veterans' diseases are caused by radiation exposure, for administrative recovery purposes, would be a step in
the right direction. This is a necessary change if the government is
going to share its broad range of tort defenses under the FTCA and
Feres doctrine with private weapons contractors. Without additional
congressional action, most atomic veterans will be forced to fight
their diseases without compensation while awaiting the results of
government tests and studies which are likely to return inconclusive
results.
Christopher C. Williams

